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Abstract 
 
 
The 1970s were a turbulent period in postwar monetary history. This paper focuses on how central 
bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), especially Alexandre Lamfalussy, the BIS’s 
Economic Adviser, responded to the Great Inflation. The breakdown of Bretton Woods forced 
central bankers to look for new monetary policy strategies as the exchange rate lost its central role. 
Lamfalussy, in his early years a Keynesian in favour of discretionary policies, moved to a 
"conservative Keynesian" position, acknowledging that a medium term orientation and the credibility 
of monetary policy were important to break inflationary expectations. However, Lamfalussy never 
moved to “monetarist” positions. Lamfalussy certainly acknowledged that monetary targets could 
reinforce the credibility and independence of monetary policy. However, he rejected mechanical 
rules. In essence he aimed for a middle position: rules applied with a pragmatic sense of discretion. 
In the early 1980s, with the rise of financial innovations, Lamfalussy would stress even more the 
limitations of monetary targeting. His focus turned increasingly to systemic financial stability risks, 
preparing the ground for the macroprudential approach of the BIS. In Lamfalussy's view, central 
banking remained an art, not a science. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about Alexandre Lamfalussy (1929-2015), and more specifically about the 
evolution in his thinking on monetary policy during the 1970s and early 1980s. Lamfalussy 
is interesting not only as an influential European economist in his own right, but also 
because of his position as Economic Adviser (and later General Manager) of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the central banks’ bank.  
Lamfalussy was not a pure academic economist. He did not actively participate in the 
theoretical debates of his time. That makes it sometimes hard to pin down his exact role 
in and contribution to the paradigm shift in economic theory and practice that took place 
in the 1970s. Nevertheless, by all accounts, Lamfalussy possessed a real talent for 
articulating economic and monetary policy dilemmas in a clear, analytical fashion that 
stimulated the internal discussions in the central banking world. He expressed his own 
views mostly internally – in informal discussions among central bankers or, more formally, 
in background papers prepared for BIS meetings – but also externally, in speeches and, 
most notably, through the BIS Annual Report. Oral tradition within the BIS confirms that 
Lamfalussy bore direct responsibility for setting the Annual Report’s key messages and 
was the main author of its widely read conclusions. 
Obviously, the views of the BIS Economic Adviser cannot be substituted for those of 
individual central banks or of the central banking community at large. Nevertheless, they 
do matter, as they are indicative of the issues at stake in the world of central banking. The 
BIS views can then be seen as a reflection, and sometimes even a catalyst, to the broader 
monetary policy debates. This was certainly the case during the 1970s-80s, when central 
banking underwent a profound paradigm shift under the influence of the collapse of 
Bretton Woods, the Great Inflation, financial liberalisation and the Latin American debt 
crisis. From his unique vantage point at the BIS, Lamfalussy can be said to have 
contributed to reshaping central banking during this crucial decade. 
This paper aims to trace the origins and influences of Lamfalussy’s thinking on monetary 
policy. The first two sections briefly review the formation and early career of Lamfalussy 
and the BIS monetary views before Lamfalussy’s arrival. The next two sections look at the 
paradigm shifts in central banking and the evolution of Lamfalussy’s ideas during the 
Great Inflation, with section four focussing on the, very important, Working Party on 
Domestic Monetary Policy. In 1981, Lamfalussy articulated his views in an illuminating 
essay – Rules vs. Discretion – which is the subject of section five. Section six goes into a 
theme of increasing importance: financial innovations. 
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The main sources for this paper are published and unpublished papers and speeches of 
Alexandre Lamfalussy, as well as archival material from the National Bank of Belgium and 
Bank for International Settlements. A problem in writing this paper was that, although 
Lamfalussy knew very well the academic literature (he taught a seminar on monetary 
theory and policy at the University of Louvain), he only rarely made explicit references to 
this literature. This makes it more difficult to situate him precisely in the academic 
debates. 
 
2 THE FORMATION AND CAREER OF ALEXANDRE LAMFALUSSY 
Alexandre Lamfalussy was born on 26 April 1929 in Kapuvar, Hungary1. In January 1949, 
after the communists had monopolised power, Lamfalussy fled to Belgium, where he 
continued his studies at the Catholic University of Louvain. At that time, Louvain was one 
of the leading places for economics in the francophone world. The dominant figure was 
Léon-H. Dupriez. He was a leading scholar in business cycle analysis, to be considered in a 
broad sense: the interaction of growth and different types of cycles in economic life. Two 
elements were typical for Dupriez’ approach to economics (Maes, 2008). Firstly, he based 
his analysis on extensive empirical investigations, paying a lot of attention to descriptive 
statistical methods, as well as to graphs and tables. Secondly, he was not in favour of 
Keynesian economics. He disliked the use of models, econometrics and national income 
accounts. For him, it was crucial that economic theory should go back to individual 
economic decisions. His theoretical framework and methodological approach were close 
to Hayek’s general equilibrium-oriented business cycle theories of the late 1920s (Hayek, 
1928).  
Contrary to Dupriez, Lamfalussy took more “Keynesian” positions. While Dupriez disliked 
formal model-building, for Lamfalussy this was a way to make explicit the implicit model 
which one was using anyway.2 Lamfalussy was also strongly in favour of government 
intervention and planning, including a selective government policy to stimulate 
investment in new industries, something which Dupriez abhorred (see the discussion in 
Dupriez, 1961). However, Dupriez’s approach of basing economic analysis on empirical 
material would become a hallmark of Lamfalussy’s style of economics. 
Lamfalussy went to Oxford for his doctorate. The theme was investment and growth in 
postwar Belgium, with Philip Andrews as supervisor and Sir John Hicks as the main 
                                                          
1  For an overview of Lamfalussy’s life, as told by himself, see Lamfalussy, Maes and Péters, 2014. An overview of 
Lamfalussy’s main publications can be found in Maes, 2017. 
2  Later, Lamfalussy (1985a, 412) remarked about Schumpeter’s growth theory: “When I read his writings, more years 
ago than I care to remember, I hardly understood what he had in mind and dismissed it anyhow because I could not 
convert it into equations”. 
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examiner. Later, under the influence of Robert Triffin, Lamfalussy spent the academic year 
1961-1962 at Yale University. It gave him an American experience as well as an 
opportunity to broaden his research to a comparative analysis of Europe’s postwar 
economic growth performance (Lamfalussy, 1963). 
So, in his early academic work, Lamfalussy focused on growth and investment theory and 
on growth patterns in postwar Europe. He emphasised virtuous (or vicious) circles, in 
which stronger export growth promotes higher investment, which in turn strengthens 
productivity and investment, further reinforcing exports. In the literature, Lamfalussy is 
considered as one of the main protagonists of the Keynesian approach of export-led 
growth in the postwar period (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996, 12). 
In the summer of 1955, Lamfalussy returned to Belgium and began working at the Banque 
de Bruxelles, Belgium’s second largest commercial bank at the time. He started as an 
economist in the Economic Studies Department, becoming the bank’s Economic Adviser in 
1962. In 1971, he became Chairman of the Executive Board. In the early 1960s, he was 
entrusted with responsibilities in the area of investment management. He was involved in 
the creation of certain mutual funds and played a role in international investment 
banking, an area which was then emerging. However, during Lamfalussy’s chairmanship of 
the Banque de Bruxelles, in 1974, some traders took large open foreign exchange positions 
which caused significant losses (Moitroux, 1995, 217). At the end of 1975, Lamfalussy 
resigned from the bank. With his experience as a commercial banker, Lamfalussy 
developed a keen awareness of the financial markets, which became a constant 
characteristic in his analysis. 
During his time at the Banque de Bruxelles, Lamfalussy’s research interests shifted to 
monetary and financial issues. He was intellectually close to the – very controversial – 
Radcliffe Report3. As Lamfalussy (1961:114) observed: “The Radcliffe Report, as a whole, 
has had a rather mixed reception; but no part of it has called forth more sceptical remarks 
than the one that insists upon the role played by the “whole liquidity position” (as 
opposed to the money supply) in checking the development of effective demand.”  
Lamfalussy defended the report, specifically against criticism from Robertson and Harrod 
who argued that the principle of “loans create deposits” applies only to banks. In their 
view, all other financial institutions were pure intermediaries, who can only lend what 
they get. Lamfalussy claimed that this argument breaks down if non-bank financial 
intermediaries provide near-money assets which are quasi-perfect substitutes for money 
held in excess of transaction balances. Consequently, effective demand in the economy 
may grow although the supply of money and liquidity preference remain unchanged. If 
non-bank financial intermediaries are able to create appropriate near-money assets, “they 
cease, of course, to be intermediaries: they become creators of near-money in just the 
                                                          
3  For a recent appraisal of the report, see Christiano and Paesani (2017). 
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same way as banks are creators of money” (Lamfalussy 1961:120). In his conclusion 
Lamfalussy emphasised the implications for monetary policy: “In an economy where there 
is a wide range of non-bank financial intermediaries (producing a wide range of near-
money assets), the dividing line between ‘intermediaries’ and creators of money or near-
money may become so blurred as to become unhelpful as a tool of analysis. And without a 
dividing line of some kind, there seems to be little hope for predicting, with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy, the impact of monetary measures on the rate of spending.” 
(Lamfalussy 1961:123). 
Lamfalussy was also involved in European and international monetary issues. He was a 
member of the Segré Committee, appointed by the European Commission, which 
investigated the integration of the capital markets in the EEC (CEC, 1966). He also 
participated in meetings of several groups on the reform of the international monetary 
system, one of the most famous being the Bellagio Group. As a result, he was well known 
by many central bank governors. It is remarquable that, in 1969, Lamfalussy, who was 
then a commercial banker and just 40 years old, was asked to give the sixth Per Jacobsson 
Lecture, on the theme The Role of Monetary Gold over the Next Ten Years. In this essay he 
sought explanations for the declining role of monetary gold and suggested a greater 
flexibility of exchange rates.  
In January 1976, Lamfalussy became the Economic Adviser of the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel. 
 
3 MONETARY POLICY CHALLENGES AFTER THE FIRST OIL SHOCK: THE BIS VIEW 
The BIS had become the foremost collaborative forum between the main central banks of 
Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan (Group of Ten). From early on, the BIS 
underpinned its activities by collecting and analysing statistical series on banking and 
finance and by conducting its own research. The BIS Economic Adviser can be said to 
present the public face of the BIS research. At the same time he engages actively with the 
central banks behind the scenes, for instance through his participation in the traditional 
G10 Governors’ meetings and in a series of expert meetings (Toniolo, 2005, 363). 
Central banks in the 1950s and 1960s operated within the framework and constraints of 
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime4. As a result of the Great Depression and 
of the Second World War, central banks had lost a great deal of their independence. In 
many countries, economic and social policy objectives took precedence over monetary 
                                                          
4  In the academic world there was quite some criticism of the Bretton Woods system, especially by monetarist 
authors. An early critic was Milton Friedman (1950). He advanced two arguments in favour of flexible exchange 
rates: the freedom of each country to pursue internal stability and the attainment of unrestricted multilateral trade. 
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policy objectives. Moreover, as enshrined by the 1959 Radcliffe Report, the importance of 
trying to regulate the growth of money stock in a modern economy was downplayed in 
favour of controlling credit (Capie, 2010, 134-37).  
The late 1960s and early 1970s represented a turbulent time in monetary history. The 
transition from the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system to floating was far from 
smooth. Two issues came to dominate the agenda of central bankers: financial (in)stability 
and inflation. 
The high-profile bankruptcy of the US bank Franklin National and of the German Bankhaus 
Herstatt in 1974 caused a shock-wave in the international financial markets. The Herstatt 
episode in particular underlined the fact that banking supervision and regulation had 
failed to keep pace with the development of the international financial markets. It 
prompted the G10 central bank Governors to create the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision to develop common standards and ensure adequate supervision of 
internationally active banks (Goodhart, 2011). 
Concerns about inflation were already voiced from the mid-1960s onward and would soon 
dominate the monetary policy debate. In the academic world, a key moment in the 
monetarist revival was Milton Friedman’s presidential address to the American Economic 
Association, “The Role of Monetary Policy”, in which he defended strongly the setting of 
money supply targets (Friedman, 1968)5. Moreover, an influential paper published in 1970 
by William Poole gave further impetus to the debate on the choice of the optimal policy 
instrument in conducting monetary policy, with a stronger emphasis on the money stock.6 
By 1970, the BIS worried about “an inflationary psychology underlying expectations and 
decision-taking throughout the economy”.7 Problems were compounded by soaring 
commodity prices and particularly by the huge increase in oil prices following the Middle 
East War in October 1973. The weight attached to the inflation problem went up in line 
with inflation itself, albeit with a certain time-lag, as illustrated by the growing frequency 
with which the term was used in the BIS Annual Reports (see graph 1). 
                                                          
5  Friedman already “restated” the quantity theory in 1956. In his view, the demand for money was a highly stable 
function of income or wealth and the rate of interest, “of the same order as many of the uniformities that form the 
basis of the physical sciences” (Friedman, 1956, 111). It would give rise to significant controversies in the academic 
world, see, e.g., Modigliani (1977) or Tobin (1972). 
6  Poole (1970), in order to deal with uncertainty, introduced a stochastic model, that emphasised the relative 
importance of random disturbances in the IS and LM functions. See also Friedman and Schwartz (1982). 
7 BIS (1970), Fortieth Annual Report, p. 8 and p. 13. 
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Monetary authorities across the industrialised world switched to restrictive policies to try 
to curb inflationary trends, most notably so in 1970-71 and again in 1973-74. 
Unsurprisingly, such policies led to an economic downturn and rising unemployment. 
Analysts were, however, confounded by the fact that monetary policy restraint did not 
have the expected effect on wage and price inflation in spite of rapidly rising 
unemployment (which contradicted the Phillips curve)8. 
During the early phase of the Great Inflation, the focus of policy-makers was foremost on 
the phenomenon of cost-push inflation, and on the detrimental price/wage spiral it was 
feeding. In the BIS analysis, money growth was usually regarded as a consequence of 
inflation, and as being largely determined by exogenous factors over which monetary 
                                                          
8 As the 1972 BIS Annual Report noted “wage/price trends were found to be less responsive than before to changes in 
demand pressures”. BIS (1972), Forty-second Annual Report, p. 34. 
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policy had little influence. The 1975 BIS Annual Report insisted that what it termed a 
“dangerous” inflationary situation “did not simply reflect mechanistic quantity-of-money 
relationships”.9  
In general, during the early 1970s, there was a more or less broadly shared opinion that 
monetary policy could only hope to achieve a limited restraining impact on inflationary 
forces, particularly because the consequences of severe monetary restraint were held to 
be unpalatable.10 These views reflected, to a large extent, the discussions that took place 
among central banks, for instance during the regular meetings of the G10 central bank 
economists at the BIS.  
The meeting of central bank economists of November 1971 discussed the money supply 
and its usefulness as an analytical tool for predicting and managing economic activity and 
prices. It emerged that while monetary policy had become more money-supply orientated 
in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, most other 
central banks had been reluctant to take that route. And even those central banks that did 
put more emphasis on controlling monetary aggregates, remained very cautious. Helmut 
Schlesinger, a future President of the Bundesbank, and regular participant of the 
monetarist Konstanz seminars (Fratianni and von Hagen 2001), warned that “strict 
adherence to Friedman’s monetary rule – if it were to be contemplated at all – would 
encounter serious practical difficulties (..). No one, for instance, can in the case of 
Germany say what the right definition of the money stock is, or what medium-term 
growth rate should be set as a target for it. It is also highly dubious whether the effects of 
monetary expansion controlled by Friedman’s monetary rule would always be acceptable 
on the political plane”.11 
Milton Gilbert, the BIS Economic Adviser at the time, and many of the participants in these 
meetings, shared a broad macro-economic view on the inflation problem, looking in the 
first place at the impact of inflation on the real economy (Gilbert, 1980). There was a 
strong sense that anti-inflation policies which would push the economy further into 
recession would be socially and politically "unacceptable. As a result, the emphasis 
remained on measures aimed at reducing cost-inflation – for instance through incomes 
policies – and at steering the economy to a more productive use of capital resources – for 
instance through discretionary credit controls. The relative easing of inflationary pressures 
in many countries, after inflation had reached a post-war peak in the course of 1974, 
seemed to vindicate these policies. 
                                                          
9 BIS (1975), Forty-fifth Annual Report, p. 166. 
10 BIS (1971), Forty-first Annual Report, p. 41: “Severe monetary restraint under these circumstances would not only 
have put pressure on the solvency of business firms, but more generally would have had difficult political and social 
consequences”. 
11 BIS (1972), The Money Supply, Economic Activity and Prices, Central Bank Series CB 368, p. 56. 
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4 ALEXANDRE LAMFALUSSY AS BIS ECONOMIC ADVISER: SHIFTING PARADIGMS 
It was in this context that Lamfalussy took up the position of Economic Adviser and Head 
of the Monetary and Economic Department at the BIS on 1 January 1976. He would hold 
this position until early 1985. He was General Manager from May 1985 until the end of 
1993. Lamfalussy combined a strong academic background with the experience of a 
commercial banker. His profound knowledge of the financial markets was a significant 
advantage in the world of central banking. An indication of Lamfalussy’s intellectual 
prominence was that he was mostly described as “Professor Lamfalussy” (he combined his 
position at the BIS with a professorship at the University of Louvain)12. 
Lamfalussy’s profile was quite different from that of Milton Gilbert, his predecessor as 
Economic Adviser, whose research focus was on the real economy, as well as on the 
international monetary system. The 1975-1976 BIS Annual Report, the first one published 
under the direction of Lamfalussy, showed some significant changes of emphasis. For 
instance, there was a new chapter entitled “Domestic credit and capital markets”. Also, 
Lamfalussy focused the analysis more on broad themes and tendencies, like recession and 
recovery, and inflation and monetary policy, something which contrasted with the 
country-by-country approach under Gilbert.  
Research and policy analysis were crucial areas of the BIS’s activity. Lamfalussy played an 
important role in this field. During his time at the BIS, research was concentrated on three 
broad topics (Lamfalussy, 1985b): (1) the international banking scene (especially the Euro-
markets and the rapid build-up of sovereign debt in the emerging economies), (2) 
domestic monetary control techniques, such as monetary targeting, on a comparative 
basis, and (3) the development of financial innovations in both the international and 
domestic markets. These were three areas of key interest to central banks and for which 
the BIS was well positioned because of the international or comparative dimension.  
Lamfalussy used “his” first Annual Report of 1976, and even more so those of 1977 and 
1978, to analyse the causes and impact of high inflation in the western economies, and to 
assess the policy reactions to it. Monetary targeting was looked upon more favourably in 
comparison to earlier Reports, although it was never considered a panacea. The 1976 
Annual Report introduced a separate chapter on “Inflation and monetary policy”, 
reviewing the monetary policy choices adopted by the main industrial countries in the 
wake of the deep recession of 1974-75 and the ensuing recovery.13 The BIS saw three 
principal causes for the persistent inflationary pressures. Firstly, developments since 1973 
had demonstrated that there was a strong interdependency between inflation and 
floating exchange rates, with movements in exchange rates exerting an effect on domestic 
                                                          
12 Interviews with several members of the BIS Staff. 
13 BIS (1976), Forty-sixth Annual Report, pp. 24-39. 
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price and wage inflation and vice versa. Secondly, the monetary financing of large public-
sector deficits contributed to the rapid growth of money supply. Thirdly, in many countries 
wages continued to increase well in excess of productivity gains. To head off a renewed 
acceleration of inflation, the BIS recommended a combination of anti-inflationary policies. 
Incomes policies and credit controls had their role to play, although it was recognised that 
perhaps too much had been expected from such policies in the past, and that they 
therefore ought to be complemented by money supply policies. However, the BIS 
cautioned against a one-sided focus on the money supply, as it remained questionable in 
how far central banks were able to exercise effective control over the quantity of money. 
In the 1977 and 1978 Annual Reports the BIS toughened its anti-inflationary stance. With 
inflation levels gradually coming down in most industrialised countries and the growth of 
output and employment remaining weak, it was tempting to revert to active demand 
management policies. The BIS was against this. Inflation remained high and was 
increasingly seen as a cause of weak growth and high unemployment. It was therefore 
right for central banks to maintain their focus on fighting inflation, making increasing use 
of new strategies and techniques – particularly in the area of monetary targeting. At the 
same time, the BIS worried about the growing divergence in policy responses to the 
stagflation crisis between the industrialised countries.14 
From early on, Lamfalussy had made it clear that his apprehension stretched beyond a 
narrow concern with inflation. In the 1977 BIS Annual Report, Lamfalussy was very critical 
of the US balance of payments deficit.15 The US current account deficit was singled out as 
the most important risk in the world economy: “While in the present circumstances such a 
deficit contributes to world recovery and facilitates the adjustment process elsewhere, it 
is in no one’s interest that it should reach excessive proportions or become lasting. It 
would be a grave mistake to believe, merely because the dollar floats, that the state and 
the structure of the US balance of payments simply do not matter. A deep US current-
account deficit, even if it were offset by capital imports, could not be a permanent 
arrangement”.16 These remarks caused something of a stir in the central banking 
community. Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger did not share Lamfalussy’s view: “the 
criticism about the American deficit voiced by the BIS in its latest Annual Report is 
regrettable”.17  
In the late 1970s there were important differences between central banks concerning 
policy priorities. While the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank emphasised the fight 
                                                          
14 BIS (1978), Forty-eight Annual Report, p. 59. 
15 BIS (1977), Forty-seventh Annual Report, p. 4. 
16 Low US interest rates in the second half of the 1970s contributed to the Latin American debt build up and the 
ensuing 1982 debt crisis. 
17 NBBA, Minutes of the 113th Meeting of the Committee of Governors, 12.07.1977. 
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against inflation, Lamfalussy focused much more on the debt build-up in the international 
financial markets (Maes, 2010). Throughout the 1970s, the massive recycling of petro-
dollars, the rapid development of emerging economies and the deregulation of financial 
markets combined to fuel the hectic growth of international banking in general, and of the 
so-called Euro-currency market in particular. Central banks were concerned as they saw 
their domestic monetary policy independence as well as global financial stability 
threatened by increasingly volatile international capital flows.  
In May 1979, the G10 Governors decided to investigate how the Euro-currency market 
could be better “controlled”. They set up three study groups, one of which was chaired by 
Lamfalussy, the so-called Working Party on Possible Approaches to Constraining the 
Growth of International Bank Lending. Within the Lamfalussy Group, there emerged 
“profound divergences”, mainly between Lamfalussy and Stephen Axilrod of the US 
Federal Reserve. 18 While Lamfalussy emphasised an approach to control international 
bank lending, as for him international debt was the key policy isssue, the Federal Reserve 
focused on the control of international liquidity, as it considered inflation as the main 
policy challenge. Lamfalussy, and other meeting participants such as the Bank of England’s 
Kit McMahon, advanced a quite innovative macroprudential approach: “focusing on 
problems that bear upon the market as a whole as distinct from an individual bank, and 
which may not be obvious at the micro-prudential level” (Maes-Clement 2016, 9-13). Not 
surprisingly, given the many “divergences”, the Working Party’s efforts did not lead to 
practical results. However, they were significant in planting the seed of a macroprudential 
approach to financial stability, which would become paramount in the 2000s.  
 
5 THE WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY 
During the late 1970s, Alexandre Lamfalussy moved from a Keynesian discretionary 
position to conservative Keynesian ideas. Indeed, in the wake of the stagflation crisis of 
the 1970s, central banks were grappling with the search for new monetary policy 
strategies. During the meeting of the Committee of Governors of EC central banks on 
13 December 1977, Gordon Richardson, the Governor of the Bank of England, suggested 
that Lamfalussy could play a key role in strategic reflections on monetary policy: Those  
 
  
                                                          
18 According to the minutes of the representatives of the National Bank of Belgium, notes of 29 June 1979 and 
20 February and 6 March 1980, NBBA, C.416/6. 
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responsible for monetary policy in the central banks of the EEC member states and those 
from non-EEC states, such as the USA, Japan and Canada, might meet from time to time, 
perhaps under the chairmanship of Professor Lamfalussy, to exchange their views”.19  
Lamfalussy immediately prepared a draft mandate to formalize such a group. The idea was 
“to provide central bank policy makers with an informal opportunity for exchanging their 
views on, and their experiences in, domestic monetary policies”.20 The working party was 
to meet at least once a year in Basel. Representation was at a very senior level, in general 
the Board member responsible for monetary policy. Lamfalussy held the chair. The 
creation of this Working Party illustrates well how the central banks considered the BIS as 
a crucial forum for research and exchange of information and ideas. As chair of the 
Working Party, Alexandre Lamfalussy made important contributions to the discussions, 
not only by providing discussion notes but also by participating actively. Very 
fundamentally, the debates in the Working Party provide crucial insights in the paradigm 
shift in central banking, as well as in the evolution of the ideas of Lamfalussy himself. 
In line with his Keynesian-Radcliffe ideas, Lamfalussy was rather sceptical about monetary 
targeting. In a meeting of the Committee of EC Governors in early 1978, he sounded a 
note of caution: “It is obvious that the Governors cannot commit to coordinating their 
monetary policies on the basis of quantitative objectives, because certain countries do not 
and cannot fix quantitative objectives, because the interpretation of quantitative 
objectives differs from country to country and depends on given circumstances, and 
because the simple, mechanical comparison of objectives would not seem to be useful”.21 
The first meeting of the working party took place in Basel on 23 October 1978 on the topic 
of “problems and techniques of monetary management”. Lamfalussy circulated an 
annotated agenda, summarizing the main positions and formulating, in a slightly 
provocative style, some key questions for discussion.22 He saw three main challenges. 
There was the persistence of high inflation in spite of the various policy measures. This 
reflected mainly the underlying, domestically-induced, cost-price inflation that remained 
stubborn. In Lamfalussy’s view, there was broad agreement among central banks that this 
                                                          
19 NBBA, Minutes of the 116th Meeting of the Committee of Governors, 13.12.1977. “Les responsables de la politique 
monétaire dans les banques centrales membres de la CEE ainsi que dans celles des pays non membres de la CEE, 
comme les États-Unis, le Japon et le Canada, pourraient se réunir de temps à autre, peut-être sous la présidence du 
Professeur Lamfalussy, pour échanger leurs réflexions”. 
20 “BIS working party on domestic monetary policy”, 14 February 1978, In BISA 7.18(15) – Papers Lamfalussy, box LAM 
26, folder 69. 
21 NBBA, Minutes of the 119th Meeting of the Committee of Governors, 14.03.1978. “Il est clair que les Gouverneurs 
ne peuvent pas s’engager à coordonner leurs politiques monétaires sur la base d’objectifs quantitatifs, car: certains 
pays ne fixent pas et peuvent pas fixer d’objectifs quantitatifs, l’interprétation des objectifs quantitatifs est variable 
selon les pays et selon les circonstances données, et la comparaison simplement mécanique de ces objectifs ne 
semble pas utile”. 
22 A. Lamfalussy, “Problems and techniques of monetary management”, 11 October 1978, In BISA 1.3A(3)I – Experts’ 
meeting: Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy, vol. 1, 1978-1980. 
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situation called for “conservatism” in monetary policies, “either to support the credibility 
of incomes policies or simply to prevent price increases from accelerating again”. 
However, on the basis of previous experience some scepticism seemed warranted: 
“Conservative, and a fortiori restrictive monetary policies might possibly prevent a 
renewed acceleration of inflation; but on what grounds can we hope that they will ever 
bring about a further reduction in inflation rates?” (emphasis in original). The two other 
main issues were: (1) the prevalence of high public sector borrowing requirements limiting 
the degree of freedom of monetary policy, and (2) the “often difficult” relationship 
between exchange rates and exchange market interventions on the one hand and money 
supply and interest rates on the other. As regards monetary techniques, Lamfalussy 
highlighted some potential problems inherent to targeting the growth of money supply. 
One key issue was that it proved difficult for many countries to meet the monetary 
targets. The deviation of actual money supply figures from announced targets was bound 
to give rise to sudden changes in expectations and as a consequence to great instability in 
interest rates.  
The discussions during the meeting in Basel followed broadly the outline provided by 
Lamfalussy.23 It might be tempting to draw a crude distinction among the central banks 
represented at the meeting between the anti-inflation hawks (those who argued that 
monetary policy should bring its full force to bear to combat inflation) and doves (those 
who were more sceptical about the impact of monetary policy and in general pleaded for 
a gradual approach). This, however, would be an oversimplification. True, Henry Wallich of 
the Federal Reserve forcefully warned against “those who argue that inflation cannot be 
reduced except by incurring enormous costs in terms of lost production”, as such opinions 
only “fostered expectation of soft policies which tended to cause inflation to accelerate”. 
And the Bundesbank’s Helmut Schlesinger underlined that central banks should not 
capitulate – as the Reichsbank had done in the 1920s – but assume responsibility for 
formulating clear and explicit policies aimed at reducing inflation. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Renaud de la Genière of the Bank of France denied that the growth of money 
supply had been a cause of inflation in France and stressed the need for a gradual 
approach, while Beauvois from the National Bank of Belgium declared himself to be “more 
pessimistic than his colleagues with respect to what monetary policy could do”. 
Nevertheless, there was broad agreement that monetary targets could play a role in 
influencing inflation expectations, particularly when other instruments had failed. John 
Fforde of the Bank of England summed up the gist of the meeting: “I came away with two 
main impressions. One was the variety of complexity and difficulty being experienced by 
central banks with respect to “targetry”. The other, which came as rather a (welcome) 
                                                          
23 “Problems and techniques of monetary management, Informal record of the meeting of the Working Party on 
Domestic Monetary Policy, Basel, 23rd October 1978”, In BISA 7.18(15) – Papers Lamfalussy, box LAM 26, folder 69. 
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surprise to me, was the vehemence with which physical controls on bank credit were 
disliked by the principal central banks concerned with administering them”.24  
The inflation debate took on a new life following the second oil shock, triggered by the 
1979 Iranian revolution. The second meeting of the Working Party was scheduled for 6 
November 1979. Central banks, Lamfalussy observed, had “become increasingly 
concerned about the effectiveness of their control techniques and the adequacy of the 
instruments available to them”. A key issue was the structural evolution towards 
increased non-bank financial intermediation – i.e. the market’s search for alternative 
credit sources, either with non-banks or abroad – which directly affected monetary policy 
implementation (for instance by rendering central bank attempts at restraining bank 
credit less effective). Lamfalussy sent round a commented draft agenda for the meeting. 25 
In addition, an overview of the instruments and techniques of monetary policy in the 
various countries was compiled.26 One of the objectives of the meeting was to contrast 
the role and effectiveness of administrative (direct) control techniques – such as credit 
ceilings, interest-rate regulations and exchange controls – with market-oriented (indirect) 
controls – mainly exercised through open-market operations. In his comments, Lamfalussy 
pointed out that while “market-oriented policy instruments would seem to increase the 
flexibility of monetary policy and the equity of its impact”, they also held the danger to 
increase the variability and unpredictability of domestic interest rates, and might 
therefore easily back-fire, as “interest rate changes are, from the political standpoint, a 
highly sensitive matter in practically all countries”. Direct, administrative controls, by 
contrast, had the advantage that they are “precise, certain and quick in their application”, 
but they were also costly in terms of the rigidities and distortions they imposed on the 
economies. 
By the time the central bank representatives convened in Basel, momentous changes had 
taken place with regard to US monetary policy. At the beginning of October 1979, the 
Federal Reserve, under its new chairman Paul Volcker, announced a series of measures 
intended to “assure better control over the expansion of money and bank credit, help 
reduce excesses in financial, foreign exchange and commodity markets and thereby 
dampen inflationary pressures”.27 At the Working Party meeting, Wallich stressed that 
these changes had been contemplated before, but it had been the sudden rise in 
inflationary expectations and in speculative pressures on the dollar exchange rate over the 
                                                          
24 Letter John Fforde, Bank of England, to Alexandre Lamfalussy, 26 October 1978, In BISA 7.18(15) – Papers 
Lamfalussy, box LAM 26, folder 69. 
25 “The implementation of monetary policy: an outline for a discussion of changing techniques and problems”, 
5 September 1979, In BISA 7.18(15) – Papers Lamfalussy, box LAM 26, folder 69. 
26 “Instruments and techniques of monetary policy: country summaries”, 12 October 1979, In BISA 1.3A(3)I – Experts’ 
meeting: Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy, vol. 1, 1978-1980. 
27 “Instruments and techniques of monetary policy: country summaries”, 12 October 1979, In BISA 1.3A(3)I – Experts’ 
meeting: Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy, vol. 1, 1978-1980, pp. 38-9. 
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summer of 1979 that had prompted the Federal Reserve to take “dramatic action to show 
that [it] was getting the situation under control”. Wallich and Axilrod left it in no doubt 
that the most important aspect of the new policy was the change in operating procedures 
with regard to the Federal Reserve’s open-market operations. The Fed had possibly 
focused too much on the Federal funds rate as an instrument to control money supply. As 
a result, all interest rates across the financial system had become very sensitive to any 
changes in the Federal funds rate, and so had politicians. Consequently, the Fed had 
become rather cautious in changing the Federal funds rate, with the risk that monetary 
policy might become pro-cyclical rather than anti-cyclical as rate changes were postponed 
for too long. To avoid this problem, the Fed had decided to try to bring the money supply 
under better control by acting directly on the level of reserves available to the banking 
system, at the same time allowing the Federal funds rate to fluctuate between much 
broader margins. After all: “The use of money supply as a basis for policy might be an 
expedient necessitated by inflation. At other times central banks might be well advised to 
operate through interest rates. At times of inflation it was uncertain what the real interest 
rate was and reliance had to be placed on the simple primitive wisdom that more money 
was more inflationary and less money was less inflationary – of that at least one could be 
reasonably confident”28.  
For the third meeting of the Working Party, on 27 October 1980, Lamfalussy explicitely 
discussed the stricter anti-inflationary attitude, which most central banks had in the 
meantime adopted, and the economic slowdown in a growing number of countries. 
Lamfalussy himself took a “conservative Keynesian” position, something which contrasted 
with his more “activist Keynesian” views in earlier years. Lamfalussy opened the meeting 
with a provocative question: “Should the fight against inflation still be regarded as a target 
of first priority, despite the more widespread economic slowdown and the noticeable 
deceleration in observed inflation rates in most industrial countries?”29 He immediately 
answered this question in the affirmative, because he considered the observed decline in 
inflation rates as somewhat deceptive, but also because of his “growing scepticism 
regarding the wisdom of trigger-happy demand management”. Then the question really 
was how much monetarism ought to be contained in the monetary policy analytical 
framework. On this issue, Lamfalussy felt himself more drawn to what he called, in stylised 
terms, a “conservative-Keynesian” attitude. In the prevailing circumstances, Lamfalussy 
wrote, “I would be inclined to favour a policy stance which would still be moderately 
restrictive – even now. The reason for this conservative-Keynesian attitude is not that I 
ignore the existence of excess supply and of unemployment, or that I underestimate the 
                                                          
28 “The implementation of monetary policy. Informal record of the meeting of the Working Party on Domestic 
Monetary Policy, Basel, 6 November 1979”, In BISA 1.3A(3)I – Experts’ meeting: Working Party on Domestic 
Monetary Policy, vol. 1, 1978-80, p. 39. 
29 Lamfalussy, A., “Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy meeting at the BIS on 27 October 1980, Introductory 
remarks by the Chairman”, 24 October 1980, In BISA 1.3A(3)I – Experts’ meeting: Working Party on Domestic 
Monetary Policy, vol. 2, 1980-83. 
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cost-push origin of current inflation in most countries, but that I believe in the importance 
of the “signal” given by monetary policy to price and wage setters, businessmen and trade 
unionists alike. How can one attach credibility to the monetary authorities’ determination 
to fight inflation in the long run unless monetary policy remains (at least moderately) tight 
in the short run? And how can one hope to break inflationary expectations and thus put 
an end to the cost price spiral unless credibility is ensured?” The main drawback of the 
monetarist approach as he saw it was that “the sharp volatility of interest rates implicit in 
the monetarist approach raises problems of its own even from a strictly domestic point of 
view. It raises even bigger ones internationally”. With reference to Lamfalussy’s distinction 
between the Keynesian and monetarist analytical frameworks, Wallich argued that: 
“… individuals were not constantly married to one or the other of these positions, but 
were driven to a particular framework by considerations of inflation or business activity”. 
However, with inflation high the interest rate instrument had become blunted as real 
interest rates were hard to interpret. A focus on the money supply, as a means of 
indirectly getting interest rates to an appropriate level, was the logical consequence: 
“inflation made monetarists of everyone to some degree”.30 
The fourth meeting of the Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy on 
18 November 1981, was an occasion for taking stock. It was remarkable that by now 
almost all major industrial countries placed strong emphasis on monetary policy in their 
struggle against inflation. While this, in the words of Helmut Schlesinger of the 
Bundesbank, “represented an important convergence of views”, differences remained 
mainly in emphasis. Lamfalussy, for his part, warned against over-reliance on the 
announcement effect of changes in policy: “The view that behaviour can be changed 
merely by announcements seems extraordinarily naïve”.31 
 
6 ALEXANDRE LAMFALUSSY’S VIEW OF “RULES VERSUS DISCRETION” 
Lamfalussy articulated his views publicly in a major essay “Rules versus discretion: an essay 
on monetary policy in an inflationary environment”, which was published as a BIS 
Economic Paper in April 1981. Samuel Brittan wrote in the Financial Times of 7 May 1981: 
“The title of the paper “Rules versus Discretion” is a sufficient summary of why the central 
bankers regard doctrinal monetarists as threats rather than as allies against inflation”. He 
further remarked: “One of the most amusing aspects of the debate is the way in which 
U.S. monetarists have switched from wanting to strengthen the freedom of the Fed from 
political pressure to wanting to bring it under closer control.” (Brittan, 1981) 
                                                          
30 “Informal record of the meeting of the Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy”, Basel, 27 October 1980, In BISA 
1.3A(3)I – Experts’ meeting: Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy, vol. 2, 1980-83, p. 1. 
31 “Informal record of the meeting of the Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy”, Basel, 18 November 1981, In 
BISA 1.3A(3)I – Experts’ meeting: Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy, vol. 2, 1980-83, pp. 13 and 43. 
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In the essay, Lamfalussy focussed on the conduct of monetary policy, and especially two 
new trends: firstly, the increasing reliance on monetary policy in fighting inflation; and, 
secondly, in the field of monetary policy techniques, the move away from discretion 
towards rules. 
Lamfalussy distinguished two schools of thought: the monetarist (quantity-theory) one 
and the “conservative Keynesian demand-management” (CKDM) school.32 In his 
presentation he focused on the features of these schools that were of direct relevance to 
practical policy issues, especially the heavy reliance on monetary policy in combating 
inflation.  
In Lamfalussy’s view, the monetarists’ stylised position was easier to sum up: “The process 
of inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon; an appropriate monetary 
policy is, therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for bringing inflation under 
control.” (Lamfalussy, 1981, 10). He then outlined the stylised position of the 
“conservative Keynesian demand-management” school. As mentioned, Lamfalussy, during 
the meeting of the Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy in October 1980, had 
explicitly expressed his sympathy for this school (something which he would not do 
explicitly in his essay). According to Lamfalussy, the CKDM economist had lost some of his 
faith in demand management, but not all of it. Monetary policy was one of the tools of 
demand management and was especially effective in the direction of restraint. A key issue 
for the CKDM economist was the establishment of the credibility of anti-inflationary 
policies, which was “a protracted, long-term affair in which success will be achieved only 
by consistently resorting to a broad set of anti-inflationary policy measures.” (Lamfalussy, 
1981, 23) 
Lamfalussy had to admit that monetarism and the use of rules in monetary policy was 
gaining ground. He identified two main reasons for this trend: firstly, the “apparent” 
failure of discretionary Keynesian demand management, coupled with incomes policies, to 
solve the problems of inflation and unemployment; and, secondly, the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Lamfalussy stresssed this second factor: 
“Floating has made the setting and the effective meeting of money-supply targets both 
possible and desirable. Possible, by avoiding central-bank intervention in the foreign 
exchange market leading to excessive money creation; and desirable, by driving home the 
truth that excessive domestic monetary expansion rapidly leads to the external 
depreciation of the currency, which then in turn fuels domestic inflation, thus pushing the 
country into the vicious spiral of depreciation/inflation.” (Lamfalussy, 1981, 7). 
                                                          
32 In the paper Lamfalussy makes no reference at all to any academic publications, making it more difficult to identify 
precisely the authors to which Lamfalussy was referring to. 
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Lamfalussy, who despised a mechanistic approach, raised a number of technical issues 
regarding the use of the monetary aggregates as a rule in monetary policy: “What is the 
functional relationship between high-powered money and not the money supply, but 
lending? How can the central bank influence credit flows? What is the specified list of 
claims held by what specified list of financial intermediaries that should enter into the 
targeted aggregate of domestic credit expansion? And how will this aggregate relate to 
the money supply – it being understood that there may be quite a few longer-term liability 
items issued by the lending institutions? It would seem highly unlikely that the answers to 
these questions could become sufficiently clear-cut as to enable the authorities to use 
mechanistic control techniques”. (Lamfalussy, 1981, 41-42). 
Lamfalussy stressed the need for discretion and flexibility. He emphasised that it was 
neither desirable, nor in many instances feasible, to dogmatically follow predetermined 
rules. Moreover, he argued that rules were not limited to money supply targets, but that 
they could also comprise other targets, like the exchange rate. 
Lamfalussy distinguished three broad arguments in favour of rules over discretion. Firstly, 
rules would strengthen the credibility of monetary policy, “setting rules and sticking to 
them will provide the best basis for establishing credibility, and without credibility 
monetary policy will neither quickly nor decisively defuse inflationary expectations.” 
(Lamfalussy, 1981, 46). Moreover, he added that any rule should be relatively simple and 
understandable to the public, and that adherence to it should be easy to verify. Moreover, 
Lamfalussy, as a good central banker, stressed that, in order to establish credibility, 
promises concerning the intermediate or even the operational targets should be kept.  
Lamfalussy saw a second “political” argument, that rules could strengthen the position of 
the central bank against pressure for more inflationary policies: “Monetary authorities 
… will come under considerable pressure from all social groups that actually benefit from 
inflation, as well as from those who are the first to be hit by an anti-inflationary policy, to 
ease their policy stance … To prevent this from happening, the pursuit of a publicly 
announced money-supply or exchange rate target may be of great help. This will be so 
especially when the setting of such targets rests on a broad social consensus which the 
above-mentioned pressure groups would be unwilling or unable to call into question 
directly.” (Lamfalussy, 1981, 48). 
Lamfalussy then turned to the third argument in favour of rules. This argument stated 
that, unless the authorities possess perfect information on how the economy works, there 
is no reason why they should be able to make correct discretionary decisions, especially in 
an environment dominated by uncertainty and unpredictable shocks. Lamfalussy referred 
here to ideas like those of Kydland and Prescott. They argued, in a seminal article, that 
discretionary policies were “not a game against nature but, rather, a game against rational 
economic agents.” (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, 473). They further argued that “active 
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stabilization may very well be dangerous and it is best that it not be attempted. 
… policymakers should follow rules rather than have discretion. The reason that they 
should not have discretion is not that they are stupid or evil but, rather, that discretion 
implies selecting the decision which is best, given the current situation. Such behavior 
either results in consistent but suboptimal planning or in economic instability.” (Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977, 487). 
Lamfalussy argued that practitioners could present two counter-arguments to this 
proposition: “The first is that there is a world of difference between assuming that the 
authorities are perfectly well informed and assuming that, on balance, they are more 
often than not misinformed. What if, on the whole, they are relatively well informed? But 
I do not want to take this counter-argument too far, for the second seems to me far more 
important. It is that, carried to its logical extreme, the “poor information” proposition 
destroys not only the case for discretionary policy measures based on ad hoc judgments, 
but the case for any policy measures whatsoever for the simple reason that the definition 
of policy rules and their practical implementation will always require judgement.” 
(Lamfalussy, 1981, 48-49). In Lamfalussy’s view, the only logical conclusion to be drawn 
from the “poor information” argument would be to condemn all government interference 
in economic matters which would imply “doing away with monetary policy”, leaving the 
creation of money to market forces. However, in Lamfalussy’s view, this went against a 
very strong consensus in society that money was a public good. 
In his conclusion, Lamfalussy dismissed as “unhelpful and unpractical” any a priori 
dogmatic discussion of the rules versus discretion issue. He admitted that both the 
credibility and the political arguments suggested that monetary policy rules could perform 
a useful function in the fight against inflation. But he warned that, “the fact that we live in 
an untidy world which does not lend itself to any easy schematisation also suggests that 
the rules should be defined, interpreted and implemented with flexibility.” (Lamfalussy, 
1981, 50). So, Lamfalussy, while closely following the academic debates, very much kept a 
pragmatic approach, seeing where these theories could help shed light on policy debates. 
Lamfalussy took up the time-consistency and credibility ideas, an important factor in his 
shift towards a conservative Keynesian position33. 
 
                                                          
33  Indeed, time consistency is probably related to more “conservative” positions. For instance, Brunnermeier, James 
and Landau (2016) offer an overview and analysis of the euro area crisis, focussing on the “Battle of ideas” between 
Germany and France. The crucial elements of the contrasting German and French philosophies are the northern 
vision about rules, rigour, and consistency, while the southern emphasis is on the need for flexibility, adaptability, 
and innovation. The rule-based approach worries a great deal about insolvency and about avoiding bailouts that will 
set a bad example and encourage inadequate behaviour among other actors (the moral hazard issue). The 
discretionary approach sees many economic issues as temporary problems that can be easily solved with an 
injection of new lending. Here the provision of liquidity is essential. To this, the adherents of the moral hazard view 
point out that costs will pile up in the future from the bad example that has been set. 
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7 FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS 
As mentioned, the third focus of Lamfalussy’s research agenda at the BIS was financial 
innovation. For Lamfalussy, it would become a further reason to be cautious with respect 
to monetary policy rules. 
In the mid-1970s, financial innovations increasingly became a topic of discussion among 
economists and policy-makers. There was a significant acceleration of financial innovation, 
initially in the United States. A crucial driving force was the interaction of rising inflation 
with regulations which limited interest rates on certain financial products. An important 
policy consequence was that conventional money demand functions began to overpredict 
the quantity of money in circulation, leading to the “puzzle of the missing money” 
(Goldfeld, 1976). Further research pointed to financial innovations and regulatory changes 
as playing an important role in these shifts (Judd and Scadding, 1982, Laidler, 1984). 
Financial innovation and its effects on monetary policy thus became a crucial issue for 
central bankers. 
Under the impulse of Lamfalussy, financial innovation became a main topic of research at 
the BIS. This was clearly apparent in the June 1983 Annual Report which included for the 
first time a chapter entitled “Financial Markets and Financial Innovations”. The main 
preoccupation was the impact financial innovations could have on monetary policy. In the 
autumn of 1983, the theme of the annual central bank economists’ meeting was 
“Financial innovation and monetary policy”. 
Lamfalussy quickly took a cautious attitude towards financial innovations. He questioned 
whether, on balance, financial innovations were a good thing. Lamfalussy accepted that 
financial innovations might improve efficiency and help protect market participants 
against uncertainty. However, in his opinion, financial innovations also create problems, 
especially for monetary policy-making, “if the result is that we end up in a monetary policy 
mess, and therefore major policy mistakes ... then I begin to have doubts about the 
balance of pros and cons” (Lamfalussy, 1983, 4). 
In the following years, Lamfalussy would become more and more cautious about financial 
innovations, not only because of their impact on monetary policy, but also because of 
their effects on the stability of the financial system (Maes, 2010). Lamfalussy was an early 
architect of the BIS macro-prudential approach, which focuses on the financial system as a 
whole, paying special attention to the risk of correlated failures and to institutions that 
have a systemic significance for the economy. This approach further emphasizes that 
systemic risk arises primarily through common exposures to macroeconomic risk factors. 
There are here important similarities with the work of Hyman Minsky, who was well 
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appreciated at the BIS (see Borio et al., 2001)34. In a certain sense, Lamfalussy always kept 
a “Keynesian” Weltanschauung, with a certain scepticism about the functioning of 
financial markets35.  
In January 1985, at the invitation of Charles Kindleberger, Lamfalussy was the speaker at a 
joint luncheon of the American Economic Association and American Finance Association. 
The topic was “The changing environment of central bank policy” (Lamfalussy, 1985a). 
Lamfalussy emphasised that the financial systems of the Western industrial countries 
were in the midst of several interconnected evolutionary processes: disinflation, 
internationalisation, innovation and deregulation. Lamfalussy started with the disinflation 
process. He stressed that the process of disinflation was going slowly, “which implied 
significant uncertainty regarding future inflation rates.” (Lamfalussy, 1985a, 410). 
Thereafter, he turned to the internationalisation process. For Lamfalussy, a crucial 
implication was that no country could isolate itself from other countries, whatever its 
exchange rate regime (an old theme of Lamfalussy’s). The third evolutionary process 
concerned the accelerating speed of financial innovation. This was leading to a flow of 
new financial instruments and techniques, as well as the blurring of dividing lines between 
institutions and between markets. An important concern for Lamfalussy was that, with 
financial innovations, the transparency of the financial system was waning. This also had 
serious consequences for the statistics which the BIS had been constructing, 
“progressively eroding the usefulness of traditionally defined international banking 
statistics and removing the little transparency which we have managed to create in this 
particular field” (Lamfalussy, 1985a, 411). His most fundamental question concerned the 
effects on financial stability of the redistribution of risk by these new techniques and 
instruments, “You may argue that when risk-averse market participants shift risks 
associated with unexpected interest and exchange rate developments onto willing risk 
takers, everybody is going to be better off. This may well be the case, but increased 
collective happiness does not necessarily mean greater systemic stability. Or does it?” 
(Lamfalussy, 1985a, 411) 
Lamfalussy emphasised that financial innovations created three main types of technical 
problems for the conduct of monetary policy: “There is the problem of identifying suitable 
targets among the monetary aggregates, broad and narrow, and of recognizing 
circumstances when it seems appropriate to deviate from these targets. At a time when 
almost all bank liabilities are beginning to carry interest, I fear that the concept of 
transactions balances itself may be becoming elusive. Then, second, there are problems 
related to the narrowly defined monetary control techniques, that is, to the operational 
                                                          
34  White (2006) also noted some interesting similarities with Austrian business cycle theories: a focus on imbalances in 
the economy, the assumption of systemic errors of judgment by economic agents, and an inherent tendency 
towards periodic crises. 
35  As also other central bankers, like Bernanke (2010: 6). See also Rajan 2010. 
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methods by which central banks try to hit their targets. Third, central banks would like to 
know whether and, if so, how the transmission mechanism from these targets to nominal 
income is affected, for example, by the proliferation of new instruments, the spreading 
use of floating interest rates or of financial futures.” (Lamfalussy, 1985a, 411). 
In his conclusion, Lamfalussy emphasised that policy-makers had to avoid to succumb to 
two opposite temptations: “One temptation is to return to complete “ad hoc-ry”, that is, 
to what the French would call “naviguer à vue”. He argued that this would be a grave 
mistake, “full discretion cannot counteract uncertainty; in all likelihood it increases it. 
Rules, be they monetary aggregates or an exchange rate target, are needed to provide 
some anchor for the wildly fluctuating expectations of market participants; to make 
monetary policymakers accountable for their action, including their decisions to deviate 
from predetermined targets; and to give them leverage in their dealings with 
governments and parliaments”. However, he also argued against the temptation of 
retreating into a world of rigid rules, “it is difficult to define such rules; it is sometimes 
impossible to apply them; and it would often be irresponsible to stick to them. The road to 
follow is somewhere in between: rules applied with a pragmatic sense of discretion. 
Admittedly, this is more easily said than done, but then monetary policy, like all other 
policies, remains an art not a science.” (Lamfalussy, 1985a, 412-413)36. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
The 1970s, with the end of the Bretton Woods system, the two oil shocks and accelerating 
inflation were a turbulent period in postwar economic history. The breakdown of Bretton 
Woods implied that central bankers had to look for new monetary policy strategies, as the 
exchange rate lost its central role, especially between big economies. Moreover, financial 
stability became a major preoccupation, certainly at the BIS, thereby marking a first, timid 
step towards what would become the macro-prudential approach typical for the BIS at a 
later stage. In this sense, and contrary to the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, 
Alexandre Lamfalussy, the BIS’s Economic Adviser at the time, was less concerned about 
the growth of the money supply and its inherent inflationary risks, than with the 
expansion of credit and the threat of a debt crisis. The Latin American debt crisis of the 
early 1980s would confirm his fear. 
This paper focused on how central bankers at the BIS thought about and reacted to the 
Great Inflation in the developed countries. Monetarist ideas, focused on flexible exchange 
rates and monetary targeting were already in the ascendency in the academic world in the 
1960s. In the 1970s, with the Great Inflation, monetarism also gained ground in the 
                                                          
36  An old theme in central banking, cf. Hawtrey, 1932. 
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central banking community, especially in the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System. 
The discussions that took place at the BIS reflected this shift, but also the widespread 
scepticism regarding purely quantitative monetary targeting. 
The BIS Annual Reports, even before the 1973 oil shock, identified inflation as a major 
policy problem. However, the analysis, strongly under the influence of Milton Gilbert, 
focused very much on cost push factors as causes of inflation. From 1976, with Alexandre 
Lamfalussy as Economic Adviser, the BIS gave much more attention to monetary and 
financial developments. The high-level BIS Working Party on Domestic Monetary Policy, 
which was created in 1978, focused specifically on problems and techniques of monetary 
management. 
During the debates at the end of the 1970s, Lamfalussy, in his early years a Keynesian in 
favour of discretionary policies, moved to a “conservative Keynesian” position, arguing 
that a medium term orientation and the credibility of monetary policy were important to 
break inflationary expectations. However, Lamfalussy and the BIS never moved to purely 
“monetarist” positions. Lamfalussy certainly acknowledged that under the right 
conditions, monetary targets could reinforce the credibility and independence of 
monetary policy. However, he stressed that also other rules, like an exchange rate target, 
could play this role. Moreover, he rejected mechanical rules. In the early 1980s, with the 
rise of financial innovations, Lamfalussy would stress even more the limitations of 
monetary targeting. In essence he aimed for a middle position: rules applied with a 
pragmatic sense of discretion. In his view, central banking remained an art, not a science. 
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